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Abstract
The present study focuses on the tension between
human versus technical risks in German companies. It
examines how employees counter cybercrime and how
this affects the company. Aim is to analyze human
threats in family businesses and to create opportunities
to use the human factor as an opportunity in the context
of technological change. For this, an empirical study
among 184 German firms was conducted. In general,
the results demonstrate an insufficient awareness of the
topic in the companies. Although companies are aware
of the need for trained employees, there is a backlog of
demand for workshops and awareness raising.
Employees are detected as the main security risk,
especially in family businesses. Better employee
training is therefore indispensable. However, even
training courses cannot prevent employees from making
mistakes in the area of cyber security. Therefore, it can
be emphasized that additional organizational security
measures are necessary.

1. Introduction
Everyday working life has seen a growing digital
change in recent years. Within service and
manufacturing companies people are increasingly using
a wide variety of technologies to encourage networking
and to simplify work [1]. Companies, irrespective of
their size and characteristics, are faced with new
opportunities but also risks in terms of the changing
framework conditions [2]. Due to the advancing
digitalization and networking, companies offer an evergrowing target for cybercrime [3]. Various potential
dangers for companies can be derived from this. For
instance, cyber-attacks can be launched with the
intention of spying on, manipulating or destroying data,
which can have significant economic consequences for
companies and can eventually lead to sustainable
reputational damage [4]. Companies are already making
several technical and procedural attempts to secure
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information. However, these approaches appear to be
flawed, as the economic damage to businesses caused
by cyber-attacks remains immense [5]. According to an
estimate by the German Association for Information
Technology, Telecommunications and New Media [6],
the overall economic damage to businesses in the years
2018 - 2019 was almost 205.7 billion euros [6]. Cyber
security, as a decisive competition factor, is not only an
essential issue for large corporations and companies.
The advancing digitalization has changed a tremendous
amount in the last years and small and medium-sized
companies are using an increasing number of digital
tools to create value due to the increasing offer of
information technology. Although there are still
differences between medium and large companies,
small and medium-sized businesses in general offer a
growing target for criminal activities by changing and
developing their business models [7].
Many of these attacks exploit human vulnerability to
extract information and thereby damage companies. A
study conducted by the consulting firm KPMG [8]
concluded, that phishing, malware and social
engineering are frequently used instruments in the
context of cybercrime [8]. Such attacks exploit human
behavior and characteristics such as fear, vulnerability,
trust or curiosity in order to influence them. By feigning
a false identity and an unrecognizable intention of the
perpetrator, victims are pressured to reveal confidential
information, to circumvent security functions or to
install malicious software on a device used for business
purposes [9]. In such cases, employees are confronted
with psychological distortions as they do not have
sufficient information to make sustainable, targeted and
rational decisions [10]. Employees are aware of the
dangers and precautions involved, but often behave
ignorantly and carelessly in dealing with cyber-risks,
such as by recklessly handling their passwords and
opening unknown emails and attachments [11]. Many
companies try to counteract these problems by warning
messages on employees' computers. Vance et al. [12]
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addressed this issue in 2018 and investigated the
effectiveness of security warnings using fMRI
(functional magnetic resonance imaging), eye tracking
and field experiments. The results of the study
confirmed a habituation to safety measures and thus
once again highlighted the human factor as a safety gap
[12].
Accordingly, the human factor is considered the
most significant weakness in relationship to cyber
security [13]. Companies hence need to become aware
of these risks and implement measures and processes
that can control and minimize them. While in the past,
companies have focused on technological development
as a countermeasure to the increasing number of cyberattacks, entrepreneurs today are aware that human
components, i.e. soft skills and an adapted mindset, can
be crucial for an improved handling of cyber-risks [14].
Although science and literature have addressed the issue
of cyber-risks for large, small and medium-sized
enterprises in various studies, there is little to no
research on this matter in relation to family-run
enterprises.
Therefore, we addressed this issue and conducted a
study on cyber security, with a special focus on the issue
of human versus technical risks in family companies.
For this purpose, a survey was conducted among
German businesses, which investigated how employees
counter cybercrime and how this affects the company.
The aim was to uncover human weaknesses in
companies and to create opportunities to use the human
factor in the context of technological change as an
opportunity. The present article is thus intended to
illustrate weak points and technical risks in connection
with human activity and reveal possibilities for
improvement for companies.

2. Humans as a cyber threat
The word ´Cyber´ is one of the most ubiquitous and
powerful terms used in the context of security studies.
However, there is no comprehensive and universal
definition of this term in the literature and it is used
unequally by different persons in different contexts [15].
As a broad definition, cyberspace can be defined as the
space created by the global network, which is generally
characterized by the elements processes, people and
technology and is characterized by the interaction and
decentralization of the actors. Here the physical
elements enable connections, data transfers, processing
and reproduction, but also exploitation and
manipulation [16]. Based on the above, the term
cybercrime describes a broad spectrum of activities and
techniques that aim to use the virtual framework
provided by internal and external networks and

accordingly mainly by the World Wide Web to extract
information from private individuals or companies, to
generate a monetary advantage for the perpetrators
themselves and to harm the victims in an economic or
reputational manner [17]. The way in which criminals
carry out cyber-attacks is increasing in both quantity and
complexity, resulting in increased costs for companies.
Since humans are still a weak link in the defense of
cyber security, this gap in particular needs to be filled
by improved cyber security.
Accordingly, the need of a decreasing number of
human errors and the success of security programs
causing from a better human awareness, various
programs are being researched for training and
education of employees, which aim to strengthen user
safety. Recommended programs tend to refer
specifically to the handling of phishing attacks, whereby
the tendency of the test persons' reaction is analyzed and
evaluated [18]. Phishing is a criminal methodology
whereby perpetrators send falsified emails to
individuals that contain links to infected websites and
have an official character. By clicking on the embedded
link, the victim unconsciously allows the perpetrator
access to personal information or even access to the
entire network of the company in which the recipient is
operating [19].
Jakobsson et al. [20] elaborate that criminals are
becoming increasingly sophisticated and brazen in their
actions. Thus, it seems inevitable that phishing mails in
the future will contain a larger element of context with
them and thus it will be more difficult for the victim to
decide to what extent the message is real or fake, making
phishing as such more effective and a greater threat to
society. For this reason, this issue should be taken
seriously [20]. One of the greatest dangers in the context
of phishing and business activities is the so-called spear
phishing. Spear phishing describes a targeted form of
phishing which, based on investigations of potential
victims, contains personalized messages, usually in the
form of e-mails, and thereby drives the victim to carry
out a supposedly necessary action [21]. Dhamja et al.
[22] illustrate various factors that favor the success of
such phishing mails. They conclude that visual
deception is a successful instrument within phishing
mails. By using visual tricks to reinforce the appearance
of authenticity of an email, victims find it difficult to
distinguish between a real and a fraudulent email or
website. The study demonstrates a success rate of the
phishing attack from a good phishing website from 90%.
For the analysis, 22 test persons were tested on 22
different websites [22].
In connection with phishing and the exploitation of
human error sources, social engineering is also
frequently mentioned in scientific literature. While
phishing attacks are the gateways for criminals to access
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sensitive data, social engineering tactics are used as the
underlying methodology and act as an enabler. Social
engineering challenges the weakest point of the security
chain, the human weakness, and tries to gain secret
information through contact on a personal level. For this
reason, social engineering is an important part of current
research [23]. The literature presents various
definitional approaches to social engineering. The
following definition proposed by Abraham and
Chengalur-Smith [24] will be used for the presented
work: They describe social engineering as “the use of
social disguises, cultural ploys, and psychological tricks
to get computer users to assist hackers in their illegal
intrusion or use of computer system and networks” [24].
Social engineering can occur in various forms. Such
methodologies of criminals can be carried out by means
of messages on social networks, by telephone, face-toface, but also especially by e-mail. Thereby the age and
gender of the potential victim is of minor relevance and
therefore such attacks represent a potential threat for all
parties involved within a company [25] and the human
error source should be considered for the entirety of the
employees.
As stated by a study by the US company KnowBe4
[26], which specializes in conducting security training
on cyber-risks, 96 percent of the companies surveyed
consider phishing fraud to be the greatest risk to their
company's security. In addition, 76 percent consider the
inattention of end users to be the main threat to their
business. Another 70 percent consider social
engineering a serious threat to their business [26].
Accordingly, the present research focuses specifically
on the human factor of cyber security, employee’s
security awareness and, in this context, phishing attacks
and social engineering. This is intended to show
companies and specifically family owned companies
their current status of their cyber security and to
demonstrate potential improvement measures.

3. Cyber security in family firms
As stated by Koeberle-Schmid [27], a family
business can be defined as a business in which at least
one family member is an active member of the top
management or supervisory board and more than 50
percent of the voting rights are actually held by the
family [27]. This definition is also assumed for the
following work.
The psychological aspect of the employees is
particularly critical within small and medium-sized
family businesses, and the human factor in the light of
cybercriminal activities must therefore be considered
explicitly [28]. Despite a gain in relevance in the context
of an increasing economic and social discussion
regarding cyber security, many companies, especially

within the small and medium-sized sector, are to
careless to establish processes and measures to establish
a holistic cyber security architecture [29]. A survey
conducted in 2019 by the social research and statistics
company Forsa [30] shows that 65% of small and
medium-sized companies have not checked whether
their data is already in circulation and data leaks exist in
the company. Furthermore, the companies state that
70% of the cyber-attacks that have taken place are
connected to phishing mails attacks, which underlines
the central importance of human factors and of methods
such as phishing and social engineering in the context of
small and medium-sized companies [30]. Aspects such
as traditions and the history of the company occupy an
essential role in relation to family businesses. This
framework, the strong links with the respective
stakeholders and the emphasis on routines often result
in an implementation of adequate data security systems
and security systems in general being implemented only
very hesitantly or not at all. Such behavior inevitably
increases the risk of cyber-attacks per se and
consequently family businesses are particularly exposed
to this danger [31].

4. Cyber security awareness
Companies try to address the risks of cyber-attacks
through various technological and procedural
adaptations. However, an approach that attempts to
prevent risks arising from such attacks based solely on
technological factors does not necessarily create a
secure and comprehensive information security
environment. Rather, the actual user, i.e. the human
factor, also contributes significantly to this. Human
factors influence how individuals deal with information
security and to what extent they integrate measures and
guidelines into their practical actions [32].
Psychological and extrinsic motivational factors make
human actions unpredictable and accordingly the human
factor is considered the weakest link within the security
chain [33]. Problems of information security can be
characterized above all by omissions and errors of
employees [34]. Increasingly, studies show the need for
qualified specialists, who can also be brought into the
company externally if required [35]. The actions of the
employees are decisive for the success of cyber security
measures. Consequently, it is essential to minimize
human vulnerabilities, which goes hand in hand with a
certain degree of information security awareness.
Accordingly, employees should be aware of cyber-risks
and be familiar with security measures and actions to be
taken in case of damage. Various studies therefore
investigating the influence of human awareness on the
success of security programs [36], examine the level of
knowledge of the test persons and the quality of safety
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training [37] and aim to highlight and combine methods
that strengthen the security awareness of employees. In
this context the research shows positive effects
especially in the combination of different measures [38].
Clark, Espinosa and DeLone [39] conclude that
knowledge within organizations in the context of
different dimensions of cyber security is unevenly
distributed between different organizational, technical
or non-technical roles. However, in order to make cyber
security effective and avoid breaches, it is essential to
balance knowledge within several departments of an
organization and establish a culture that provides a
certain understanding of cyber security for the entire
organizational unit. The study also indicates that various
industries and companies have a different understanding
of the threats posed by cyber-attacks [39]. These
differences can also occur in small and medium-sized
companies and must be reduced to a consensus in order
to deal effectively with cyber-risks. Furthermore,
Pienta, Tams and Thatcher [40] point out that the factors
of trust and attention play an essential role within the
framework of cyber security awareness and that these
factors must be taken into account within the alignment
of the internal security infrastructure. The study
illustrates the necessity of trust on the one hand and the
problem of thoughtless compliance on the other [40].

5. Derivation of hypotheses
Based on the following hypotheses, the problem of
the human element as a source of error in family
businesses is addressed. Family businesses are typically
small or medium-sized enterprises; therefore, they are
often classified among such businesses. As can be seen
in the literature, analyses of small and medium-sized
enterprises, and thus especially family businesses, often
highlight the human factor as an area for improvement
in order to provide effective cyber security [41]. Mainly
small and medium-sized companies tend to be negligent
in establishing processes and measures [42], which
offers attackers great potential to exploit humans as a
security hole. Additionally, the mentioned differences
between sectors and companies regarding their
perceiption of the threats associated with cyber-attacks
[43] leads to the fact, that the human factor is involved
in security measures to varying degrees. Based on the
literature listed, however, it can be assumed that
particularly family businesses have recognized the
employee and thus the human factor as a security
vulnerability. Accordingly, the following hypothesis H1
can be made, which following must be checked:
H1: Family Firms see employees more often as
security risks than non-family firms.

As already mentioned, especially problems related
to information security are attributed to human failure
[44]. However, information security in particular is a
sensitive topic in the public perception. Therefore, trust
and long-term thinking within the company is often
emphasized as the business fundamentals of family
businesses, which is why customers and suppliers
assume appropriate data protection [45]. Hence, the
training of employees on issues related to cyber security
is essential. Often family businesses also bear the family
name of their owners; damages to their business
reputation therefore also affects family members as
private individuals [46]. For these reasons, it can be
concluded that family businesses in particular should
show a special interest in providing training in relation
to the prevention of cyber-attacks. Based on the
hypothesis H2, it should thus be examined whether
family businesses have recognised the need for cyber
security measures or whether there is still a requirement
for clarification in this area.
H2: Family Firms perceive educating their
employees more often as a requirement for the future
than non-family firms.
In addition to the interest in further training
measures for employees in the company, the actual
coverage of the need for this must also be analysed.
While non-family businesses use their financial
resources in an economically target-oriented manner to
improve employee education and training, the financial
resources of family businesses could be channelled into
other areas of the company due to an underlying
emotional bias [47]. In addition, family businesses, as
described above, usually have smaller company sizes
and, consequently, limited financial resources for
further training of employees. In this paper we address
this statement with reference to hypothesis H3. This
hypothesis assumes that family enterprises offer fewer
training and educational opportunities than non-family
enterprises and thus do not sufficiently cover the
demand for further training measures.
H3: Employees in family firms show lower levels in
cyber training and education than those in non-family
firms.
However, the appropriate actions of employees are
crucial for the success of security measures already
implemented. A sufficient sensitization of the
employees is essential to minimize human weaknesses
and ensures that they are prepared in case of damage
[48]. A lack of training and education indicates a lower
cyber security awareness among employees.
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Furthermore, it can be assumed that routines and
very hesitantly implemented security measures in
family businesses contribute to a reduced level of
awareness among employees [49]. Consequently,
hypothesis H4 will be used to test whether employees in
family businesses are less sensitive to security-related
issues than employees in non-family businesses.
H4: Employees in family businesses are less
sensitized to security-related issues than employees in
non-family firms.

6. Methodology
6.1 Sample description
The data collection was carried out by means of a
standardized online questionnaire containing open and
closed questions. In order to check the questionnaire, a
pre-test was first carried out with several test persons.
Subsequently, the actual survey was conducted in the
period from October to December 2019. For this
purpose, e-mail addresses of German companies were
randomly selected in advance using the Nexis database.
A total of 14,495 companies were contacted by email, of which 1,612 e-mails could not be delivered.
Thus 12,883 companies received the link to the online
survey. The online questionnaire was accessed 415
times during the survey period, which corresponds to a
participation rate of 3.22 percent. 372 companies
answered the questions asked, with 188 companies
having terminated the survey prematurely (utilization
rate: 89.64 percent). The sample size thus amounts to
184 companies and the response rate to 1.43 percent.
It should also be mentioned that the number of
answers may vary. This is related to the fact that the
questionnaire was deliberately designed without
specifying mandatory questions, as in some cases very
topic-specific and sensitive data was requested. The data
was evaluated using Microsoft Excel and SPSS.

6.2 Independent variables
The independent variable in the study is family
influence. There are several operationalizations for this
variable in the literature. Since the companies in the
survey are primarily small and medium-sized
enterprises and family businesses, which tend to answer
less when questions are too complex, a single-item
approach was chosen for the present study. To measure
family influence, a 0/1 coded question "Is your company
a family business" was used, which yields the variable
FAMILY. Of the 184 companies in the study, 106 are
family enterprises and 78 are non-family enterprises.

6.3 Dependent variables
A different dependent variable was defined for each
of the four hypotheses.
For H1, the dependent variable is SEC_RISK. This
variable describes whether companies assess employees
as a security risk. The variable was queried as a singleitem variable on a five-level Likert scale with the
response alternatives 1=very low to 5=very high.
For H2 the dependent variable is EMPL_EDUC.
The question here is whether companies see deficits in
the training and further education of their employees in
the area of cyber security. This is also a five-level Likert
scale with the answer alternatives 1=very low backlog
demand to 5=very high backlog demand.
For H3 the dependent variable is TRAIN_LEV.
Here, a binary 0/1 level was used to measure whether
the companies have a lot of catching up to do in terms
of the training and further training of their employees in
the area of cyber security.
For H4 the dependent variable is SENS_ISSUES.
Here, the questionnaire used five-level Likert scales
from 1=very low to 5=very high to ask employees about
their awareness of ten aspects, including data protection,
Internet security, password security, phishing and social
engineering. An explorative factor analysis was then
carried out, as all ten start variables correlate with each
other. According to eigenvalue criteria only one factor
was extracted. This factor forms the basis for the
variable SENS_ISSUES.

6.4 Control variables
As a control variable, as in other, organisationrelated studies, the company size was also chosen as a
complexity-generating factor. The size of the enterprise
- variable SIZE - was operationalized by the number of
employees. The number of employees was surveyed in
four classes:
- SIZE_99: enterprises with up to 99 employees
(n=34);
- SIZE_100_999: enterprises with between 100
and 999 employees (n=122);
- SIZE_1000_9999: companies with between
1,000 and 9,999 employees (n=17);
- SIZE_10000: enterprises with 10,000 or more
employees (n=4).
The class up to 99 employees was chosen as the
reference class.

Page 4552

7. Empirical Results

7.3 Test of hypothesis 2

Various regression models were used to test the
hypotheses depending on the scale level of the
dependent variables. The following section first shows
the correlations of the variables processed in the study.

To test hypothesis 2, a linear regression was applied.
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3.
In contrast to hypothesis 1, this model does not show
good model quality. In addition, no effect of FAMILY
can be seen. A significant explanatory contribution is
only found in the group of companies between 1,000
and 9,999 employees. These companies see stronger

7.1 Correlations

Table 1: Correlations

Table 1 shows the correlation of this study.
Interestingly, as can be observed, there is no correlation
between family influence and the number of employees.
Even at first glance, FAMILY correlates with the
variable SEC_RISK. It seems interesting that in the
group of companies with up to 99 employees a different
perception seems to exist here. There are some
correlations between the various dependent variables,
which are marked in the table here.

7.2 Test of hypothesis 1
To test hypothesis 1, a linear regression was applied
(model 2). The results of the regression are shown in
Table 2. The hypothesis test shows a correlation
between FAMILY and SEC_RISK. Family businesses
perceive their employees as a security risk significantly
more often. Also significant are size effects in the two
groups of employee numbers up to 9,999 employees.
Hypothesis 1 can therefore be retained.
Table 2: Test of hypothesis 1
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY
SIZE100_999
SIZE1000_9999
SIZE10000
Model fit
R²
Adjusted R²
F (Model, global)

Model 1
SEC_RISK
ß-Coeff.
0.218
0.215
0.240
0.091
0.103
0.083
5.135

p-Value
Tolerance
0.002
0.998
0.009
0.746
0.003
0.779
0.214
0.931

VIF
1.002
1.340
1.284
1.074

deficits in the training and further training of their
employees. Hypothesis 2 is therefore rejected.
Table 3: Test of hypothesis 2

Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY
SIZE100_999
SIZE1000_9999
SIZE10000
Model fit
R²
Adjusted R²
F (Model, global)

Model 2
EMPL_EDUC
ß-Coeff.
p-Value
Tolerance
0.071
0.336
0.998
0.097
0.255
0.746
0.142
0.090
0.779
0.103
0.179
0.931

VIF
1.002
1.340
1.284
1.074

0.027
0.005
1.245

7.4 Test of hypothesis 3
To test hypothesis 3, a binary logistic regression was
applied. The results of the regression are shown in Table
4. Hypothesis 3 does not provide satisfactory results
either. The model quality is not sufficient and FAMILY
shows no effects. Only the companies in the size
category 100-999 employees see a large backlog
demand in the training and further training of
employees. H3 is therefore also rejected.

***
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Table 4: Test of hypothesis 3

Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY
SIZE100_999
SIZE1000_9999
SIZE10000
Constant
Model fit
-2LL
Cox and Snell R²
Nagelkerkes R²

Model 3
TRAIN_LEV
ß-Coeff.
0.224

Sig.
0.476

0.642

0.083

0.468

0.433

-0.133

0.899

0.021

0.953

*

235.078
0.021
0.029

7.5 Test of hypothesis 4
To test hypothesis 4, a linear regression was applied.
The results of the regression are shown in Table 5. The
model quality is good. However, the explanatory
contribution refers exclusively to the size effects to be
found in the model. From 1,000 employees upwards,
companies are noticing a greater awareness of cyber
security and cyber risk issues among their employees.
Hypothesis 4 is also rejected, however.
Table 5: Test of hypothesis 4

8. Discussion and Conclusion
In connection with the topic of the impact of human
threats on the cyber security of family businesses, the
responses of a total of 184 German companies were
analyzed. The results show that German companies - at
least those companies in the sample that mainly
represent small and medium-sized family businesses are generally not very sensitive to this topic.
Accordingly, companies should be made more aware of
the need for cyber security measures.
On the basis of the analyses, it was found that
employee companies are classified as a risk to the

company in terms of their respective cyber security,
with family companies more often recognizing their
employees as a security problem than non-family
companies. These results show that although the need
for trained employees in the company has been
identified, the measures are not sufficiently
implemented. In summary, there is still a backlog
demand for workshops and training courses to increase
the cyber security awareness of employees, close
security gaps and be prepared for incidents. With regard
to the postulated connection with family influence,
however, the expected effects only became apparent
with regard to the assessment of employees as security
risks. In the other areas, no difference was found
between family businesses and non-family businesses.
Rather, there is the impression that cyber security is
rather a topic of organisational complexity, as some
economies of scale are evident. Whether and to what
extent family businesses in the field of cyber security
address potential deficits through organizational
measures or informal variables such as trust could not
be investigated by our research design.
As the literature shows, there is a particular need to
train employees in areas such as phishing and social
engineering. While the literature also frequently
assumes psychological backgrounds among employees
as sources of error, the present study clearly emphasizes
the need for better employee awareness as a solution
approach. By sensitizing employees and providing
better training within the company, it is possible to
reduce human error and to see people less as a source of
problems and more as an opportunity for improved
cyber security.
However, it should be noted at this point that even
training cannot prevent all the mistakes made by
employees in the area of cyber security. For this reason,
organisational security measures such as the integration
of information security management systems and the
establishment of ISO 27001 are necessary for effective
cyber security in the company, and the introduction of a
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is also
advisable.
The present study is subject to some restrictions: In
our opinion, this is the first survey-based survey on
cyber security in family businesses. However, the study
focuses purely on German companies. In addition, the
rather low response rate and a possible single informant
bias should also be mentioned. Follow-up studies should
be conducted here.
In general, the present study opens up the relevance
of further research on the topic of cyber security in
family businesses, as this is so far a barely researched
topic, but will become considerably more important in
the future due to the advancing digitalization. Analyses
using fMRI and eye tracking could prove to be
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particularly exciting and insightful for a better
understanding in the given context.
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